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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1 1: :ie C : i n I: of \ppeals has jurisdiction

- .

Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Should the trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis that Appellant has failed
to maishal the evidence in support of tl ic ti: ia 1 coi n: !:' s fii: idi ngs?
z.

Did the trial court correctly recognize that through the parties' actions, words,

and documentation of their transaction, they had reached a "meeting of the minds MI ft it in til in
establish an niforceable ecu Itract?
;.)id the trial court properly refuse to grant Embassy relief on their equitable
'i

»l i r h i i i n i ! un lli< b;i\i\ !(i;it Ilien

JI'|MJIMLMII

did l lot

the Utah Statute of Frauds?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
RULE 52(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
. . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. , . .

1

i

§ 25-5-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 as amended)
Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Procedural Background
Appellant/Plaintiff,

Embassy Group, Inc., originally filed this action against

Appellees/Defendants, T. Daryl and Maureen E. Hatch, on or about August 14, 1990. Embassy
Group, Inc. is the successor to Granada, Inc. as a general partner of a Utah Limited Partnership
by the name of Shim Investments (R. 172). Granada, Inc. was a co-general partner of Shim
until December 4, 1986. {See Complaint page 3). Embassy Group, Inc. asserted at trial that
it had been assigned all of Shim's rights in the contract with the Hatches (R. 172).
Appellant's original complaint sought enforcement of an alleged oral agreement for the
purchase of real property, or in the alternative, reformation of the parties' written agreement on
the basis of mutual mistake, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Further, Appellant asserted a right
to acquire quiet title to all of Lot 33 of the Bridlewood Subdivision Phase II. (Complaint at p.7).
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Appellees argued that the Appellant's claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds
provisions contained in U.C.A. Section 25-5-1, that the final documents which were the subject
of the litigation accurately reflected the agreement ultimately reached by the parties, that the
Appellees fully performed their obligations under the agreement, and that Appellant's claims
were wholly without merit.
The case was tried on December 12 and 13, 1991, without a jury before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Cornaby rendered oral findings and
conclusions from the bench and granted judgment in favor of the Hatches, concluding Embassy
was not entitled to recover under any of the claims plead (R. 301-309).
On or about December 31, 1991, the Hatches submitted their Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment to the Court. On January 23, 1992, Embassy filed its
objection to the entry of said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. On
January 29, 1992, Judge Cornaby executed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
entered Judgment in favor of the Hatches.
During the early part of June 1992, Embassy filed a Notice to Submit for Decision
related to their January 23, 1992 Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Judge Cornaby thereafter, on June 5, 1992, issued a written denial as to all of the objections
raised by Embassy.
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Statement of Material Facts
1.

During the latter part of the summer in 1986, Embassy's predecessor, Granada,

Inc./Shim Investments and the Hatches entered into negotiations for the purchase of a building
lot in the Bridlewood Subdivision in Bountiful, Utah, Davis County. (R. 63-67, 228, 242-246).
2.

The parties discussed numerous options concerning the purchase of a building lot

for the Defendants' proposed home. Ultimately, the parties' negotiations focused on Lot 33 of
the Bridlewood Subdivision (R. 228, 242-246).
3.

The majority of the adjacent and surrounding lots in the area were being marketed

for $30,000.00 to $40,000.00 per lot (R. 96, 120).
4.

Lot 33 was larger in size than the majority of the surrounding lots, however,

because Lot 33 sloped dramatically downward toward the rear of the lot, its buildable area was
substantially reduced (R. 121).
5.

From the outset, the Hatches advised Granada, Inc./Shim Investment's agent,

Mark Wahlquist, that they could only afford a lot in the $40,000.00 range (R. 66).
6.

During the negotiation for the purchase price of the building lot, the parties

discussed various prices for various lots and portions of lots, including Lot 33 of the Bridlewood
Subdivision (R. 228, 242-246).
7.

Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement whereby the Hatches would purchase

Lot 33 of the Bridlewood Subdivision for $40,000.00. The terms of the purchase were to be
$20,000.00 down payment at the time of closing, and $20,000.00 on a Trust Deed Note due and
payable at such time as the Hatches obtained long-term financing on their new home or
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November 25, 1987, whichever occurred first (R. 228-231).
8.

Embassy's agent, Mark Wahlquist, made all arrangements for the closing and

preparation of the necessary documents with Associated Title Company (R. 79-80).
9.

Pursuant to Mr. Wahlquist's direction, Associated Title prepared the appropriate

deeds and instructions consistent with the parties' agreement. Mr. Wahlquist also ordered a title
report and title insurance policy on all of Lot 33 for the benefit of the Hatches as the purchaser
(R. 79-85).
10.

Closing on the transaction took place on November 25, 1986.

11.

Associated Title Company prepared a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note for the

$20,000.00 contract amount, and Buyer's and Seller's Statements reflecting the total sales price
of $40,000.00, $20,000.00 due at closing, and $20,000.00 carried on the Trust Deed Note (Trial
Exhibits P-9 and D-5).
12.

Plaintiffs agent, Mark Wahlquist, executed the Seller's Statement and the Trust

Deed Note, indicating his approval of the documents as they were prepared by Associated Title
(R. 75-76).
13.

Simultaneously, Keith B. Sorenson, Vice President of Embassy's predecessor,

Granada, Inc., executed and delivered a Special Warranty Deed conveying all of Lot 33 to
Defendants. The Special Warranty Deed was recorded in the office of the Davis County
Recorder's Office the following day, November 26, 1986 (R. 76-77).
14.

On or about July 22, 1987, Defendants' lender, First Security Bank, paid the

$20,000.00 Trust Deed Note directly to Granada, Inc./Shim Investments from the long-term loan
proceeds on the home (Trial Exhibit D-3).
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15.

On or about that same day, Associated Title, as trustee, transferred a Deed of

Trust to the Hatches for Lot 33 as directed by Granada, Inc./Shim Investments (Trial Exhibit
P-8).
16.

During the last week of December, 1989, C. Dean Larsen contacted Defendant

Hatch and erroneously indicated that the Trust Deed Note was past due (R. 204).
17.

On March 13, 1990, Larsen wrote Hatch a letter again demanding that the balance

of the Trust Deed Note be paid off, this time asserting that $40,000.00 remained due and owing.
Defendant informed Larsen that the Note had previously been paid and he did not owe an
additional $40,000.00 (R. 204-205).
18.

On or about March 19, 1990, C. Dean Larsen, President of Embassy

Management Group, Inc., wrongfully filed a Notice of Interest against Lot 33 of the Bridlewood
Subdivision.
19.

Thereafter, Embassy filed this action in the Second Judicial District Court for the

State of Utah on August 16, 1990.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Embassy has failed to meet the standards set forth in Rule 52(a), and interpreted by the
recent decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, to show the trial court committed
substantial error in making the findings and judgment which it did. The legal presumption that
the trial court's findings and judgment are valid and correct has not been overcome by a
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compelling showing that the trial court committed reversible error.
More specifically, Embassy has not marshaled all of the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings. Rather, they have attempted to cite the court to the conflicting evidence in light
most favorable to their position and have ignored the plethora of contrary evidence relied upon
by the trial court in making its ruling. Most critical is the absence of any reference to the
documentary exhibits received into evidence which support the trial court's decision.
Because Embassy has not made the necessary showing, nor overcome the requisite
burden of Rule 52(a), particularly when one considers that the record on review must be
construed in the light most favorable to the Hatches in this case, their appeal must be denied.
There is no justiciable reason to disturb the trial court's findings.

II.

The trial court properly concluded that the written documentation prepared and executed
by Embassy was tantamount to the fact that the parties did reach a "meeting of the minds."
The law generally states that there can be no contract without a meeting of the minds
of the parties, which must be spelled out either expressly or impliedly with sufficient definiteness
to allow enforcement.

However, the court will look to the memorialization of the parties'

agreement to identify what their intentions were. The documents related to this transaction are
not ambiguous nor are they unclear. Without any argument, all of the written documentation
executed by the parties at closing provides that Lot 33 was to be transferred to the Hatches for
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a total of $40,000. That transaction was to be in two parts, $20,000 to be paid at closing, and
$20,000 at such time as the Hatches obtained their long term financing or November 25, 1987,
whichever occurred first. It is undisputed that those amounts were timely paid.
For Embassy to argue that they understood the agreement to be something different than
as provided for in all of the closing documents, which were directed to be prepared by them and
thereafter executed by them, is simply not credible. The law will not test the parties' "meeting
of the minds" on some post-event, subjective theory, that works only to the advantage of the
seller herein. Rather, the trial court correctly identified the parties' intended "meeting of the
minds" based upon the evidence before it.

IIL
The trial court correctly recognized the applicable provisions of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 25-5-1, which sets forth the Statute of Frauds and how it relates to this transaction for
the purchase of real estate. The Statute requires that any estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, and any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, or surrendered
unless it is in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
All of the closing documents, Buyer's Statement, Seller's Statement, the recorded Deed
on the property and the Trust Deed Note, all reflect that the purchase price was $40,000.00.
Embassy's own witnesses even admitted at the time of trial that there was no documentation
evidencing the sale of Lot 33 for more than $40,000.00. Having failed to produce such a
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writing, Embassy's claims were properly barred by the trial court pursuant to the provisions of
the Utah Statute of Frauds.
The provisions of the Statute of Frauds applicable to contracts affecting interests in land
were adopted for the express purpose of preventing existing estates in land from being upset by
parol evidence, and to preserve the title to real property from the changes, the uncertainty, and
the fraud, attending the admission of parol testimony. It would have been reversible error for
the trial court to rule any other way than the way it did.

IV.
Embassy's claims for restitution under a theory of unjust enrichment must also fail. In
order to properly be awarded restitution under a theory of quantum meruit, Embassy must show
that no written or oral contract existed. The parties did in fact have a contract to purchase Lot
33 for $40,000, and thus recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment was properly denied.
This transaction was covered by an express contract whose terms were clear and unequivocal.
There could be no finding in equity that they were entitled to restitution.
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ARGUMENT
I.
EMBASSY HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, THEREFORE REQUIRING
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT TO BE AFFIRMED
As appellant, Embassy bears a substantial burden of establishing that the trial court
committed reversible error. Their challenge to the findings and judgment of the trial court
requires that they sustain the burden of showing "clearly erroneous" reversible error. Rule 52(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006, 1016 (Utah 1991); West Valley
City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991),,
The appropriate standard of review applicable to a challenge of the trial court's findings
and judgment is that the appellate court should regard the trial court's finding and judgment with
a presumption of validity and correctness. Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P.; Doelle v. Bradley. 784
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Hatcheson v. Gleave. 632 P.2d 815 (1981); Kohler v. Garden Citv.
639 P.2d 162 (1981).
Embassy is required to sustain that burden of showing error, based upon a review by the
appellate court with a presumption of validity to the findings and judgment of the trial court, and
that the record be construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial court
level. The decision of the trial court should not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds
substantial support for such reversal in the evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, supra, 784 P.2d at
1178; Hatcheson v. Gleave. supra: Kohler v. Garden City, supra.
10

To successfully attack findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in light most favorable to the
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings. Wade v. Jobe. supra. 818
P.2d at 1016; West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d at 1313; Doelle v. Bradley.
supra. 784 P.2d at 1178 (Utah App. 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. 776
P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Scharfv.
BMG Corp.. 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).l
The legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined under Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(A). A trial
court's factual finding is deemed " clearly erroneous" only if it is against the clear weight of
evidence. Wade v. Jobe. supra. 818 P.2d at 1016; West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818
P.2d at 1313; Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, supra. 776 P. 2d at 899-900; In
re Estate of Bartell. supra. 776 P. 2d at 886; See Western Kane County Special Service. Dist.
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P. 2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
In the present case, Embassy has not marshaled all the evidence to demonstrate that the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings is legally insufficient. Their brief presents the

*The Utah Court of Appeals has previously stated, "The challenging party must marshal all
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the
findings are clearly erroneous. Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989). We have
shown no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence. See
e.g.. Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990); Tumbaugh v. Anderson. 793 P.2d939
(Utah App. 1990)."
11

conflicting evidence in light most favorable to their position and largely ignores the contrary
evidence. The Utah Supreme Court held specifically in the case of Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d
1176, 1178 (Utah 1989) that:
In the present case, Robert has not attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and demonstrate that the evidence supporting the findings is legally
insufficient. His brief presents the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to his
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence. Therefore, there is no reason for us
to disturb the trial court's findings.
Id. at 1178; See also, West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Iriv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App.
1991).
For example, Embassy argues that the Trial Court's written finding of fact No. 7 is
"clearly erroneous." (Appellant's Brief at 26). Therein the Trial Court found:
7.
All of the written documentation concerning the sale of Lot 33 to the defendants
indicates that the purchase price was $40,000.00. (Findings of Fact at 2).
The Trial Court received into evidence Plaintiffs Exhibits P-6 [Executed Earnest Money
Agreement, (R. 36-40); P-7 [Seller's Closing Statement] (R. 42-43); P-8 [Deed of Trust] (R.
208); P-9 [Trust Deed Note] (R. 208); and P-10 [Special Warranty Deed] (R. 44-46). In
addition, the Trial Court received Defendant's Exhibits Nos. D-l [Purchaser's Closing
Statement] (R. 209, 234); D-2 [Title Insurance Policy] (R. 209, 234); and D-3 [FSB Loan
Proceeds Breakdown] (R. 209).
Each of these Exhibits either on their face or coupled with the witness testimony
attendant to their admission indicates that the purchase price of Lot 33 was to be $40,000.00.
Embassy's argument that the Trial Court's finding that the documents indicated the purchase
price was to be $40,000.00 was in error are without any foundation. To the contrary, because
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the Trial Court was not presented any documentary evidence to support Embassy's claim that
the sale was to be for $80,000.00, the Trial Court was left with no alternative but to find as it
did:
All the written documents do show $40,000, and that does create a problem so far as
Statute of Frauds. If the sale price was really $80,000 and if both plaintiff and
defendant understood it was $80,000, then the Court can't escape from the fact that they
were conspiring to deceive the lender bank. . . . And so if they had gone ahead with the
transaction from the view of Mr. Wahlquist, it would have been with what we in the law
call unclean hands. . . (R. 304).
The trial transcript is replete with testimony and evidence to support the Trial Court's
finding that the sales price of Lot 33 was to be $40,000. (R. 228, 231, 235, 237-238, 243, 246,
36-40, 42-43, 44-46, 208, and 234; See also, Trial Exhibits P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, D-l, D-2,
and D-3). The trial court was very careful to consider each of the issues which Embassy has
raised on appeal. The trial court heard and received extensive evidence which supports the
findings it ultimately reached.
The standard of appellate review as enumerated in Rule 52(a), and recent decisions of
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, dictate that appellants bear a significant burden to show
the trial court committed substantial error in making the findings and judgment which it did.
The legal presumption that the trial court's findings and judgment are valid and correct must be
overcome by a compelling showing that the trial court committed reversible error.
Embassy has not made such a showing nor have they overcome that burden, particularly
when one considers that the record on review must be construed in the light most favorable to
the Hatches in this case. There is therefore no reason to disturb the trial court's findings.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION PREPARED AND
EXECUTED BY EMBASSY WAS THE BEST EVIDENCE
OF THE PARTIES5 "MEETING OF THE MINDS"
Appellants have offered the argument that the Trial Court erred in recognizing an
enforceable contract between the parties, and suggest that there was no "meeting of the minds"
between the parties as to their agreement. (Appellant's Brief at 8-15). They have cited three
Utah cases to support their argument. However, those cases are easily distinguished from the
case now before the Court in that in each instance cited, there was no clearly expressed or
written agreement to evidence the terms of their accord.2
The more correct principle of law is that there can be no contract without a meeting of
the minds of the parties which must be spelled out either expressly or impliedly with sufficient
definiteness to allow enforcement. Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961) as cited in
Oberhanslv v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).

A condition precedent to the

enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must
be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly. Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah. Inc., 558
2

The Davis (sic) v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) case cited by the Appellants dealt
specifically with a dispute over an oral agreement for the construction of four duplexes. The
Cessan (sic) Fin. Corp. v. Meyer. 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978) case is cited by Appellants for
the proposition that "[Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing
in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all terms." The Cessna, supra, case involved
a blank space in a guaranty agreement, and even the Cessna, supra. Court held that this was
merely a general proposition not on point in that case. (See, Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 746
P.2d at 1050). Finally, the Oberhanslv v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) case involved
conflicting terms contained within the parties' written agreement. Appellees contend that each
of these cases are distinguishable.
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P.2d 1317 (Utah 1975).
Appellants have argued that there was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33
because there was no meeting of the minds as to the terms for its sale. (Appellants' Brief Pg.
9). It is universally accepted that a "meeting of the minds" is not an unvarying prerequisite to
an enforceable contract. In fact, "the cases demonstrate plainly enough that a person may be
held bound in accordance with his expressions as understood by others, even though his own
intention and meaning were different." Corbin on Contracts, §§106-107 (5th Ed.).
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed a similar case to the instant case when it held in
Verhoef v. Aston. 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah App. 1987) that:
Contracts should be construed so as to give effect to the parties' intentions, and such
intent should be determined, if possible, by examining the written agreement executed
by the parties. Citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
Verhoef v. Aston, supra, 740 P.2d at 1344.
In the Verhoef. supra, case, there was a dispute between the terms of an Earnest Money
Agreement and those identified in a subsequent Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Court
pointed out that a basic tenet of contract law is that prior negotiations and agreements merge into
the final written agreement on the subject. 740 P.2d at 1344, citing Dix Steel Co. v. Miles
Const. Co.. 443 P.2d 532, 535-36 (Wash. 1968). The Utah Court of Appeals determined in the
Verhoef supra case, that the uniform real estate contract was unambiguous and binding, and
accordingly refused to find that there had been no meeting of the minds. Id. 740 P.2d at 1344.
If there was no "meeting of the minds" as to the terms of the parties' agreement in this
case, it would seem inconsistent that Appellants would have directed the preparation of the
closing documents as they did, and wholly implausible that they would execute and record them.
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The record and the exhibits received into evidence at trial clearly support the Court's finding that
the documentary evidence of this transaction contemplated a $40,000.00 purchase price. (R. 228,
231, 235, 237-238, 243, 246, 36-40, 42-43, 44-46, 208, and 234; See also, Trial Exhibits P-6,
P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, D-l, D-2, and D-3).

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS IN EQUITY BECAUSE THEY WERE
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS U.C.A. SECTION 25-5-1.
The trial court recognized the applicable provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 255-1, which sets forth the Statute of Frauds as follows (See R. at 304):
Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Despite the fact that all of the closing documents (R. 228, 231, 235, 237-238, 243, 246,
36-40, 42-43, 44-46, 208, and 234; See also, Trial Exhibits P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, D-l, D-2,
and D-3), the recorded Deed on the property (P-8) and the Trust Deed Note (P-9), all reflect
that the purchase price was $40,000.00, Embassy's own witnesses admitted at the time of trial
that there was no documentation evidencing the sale of Lot 33 for more than $40,000.00. (R.
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90, 54-62).3
Appellant's principals were sophisticated real estate developers (R. 213). Several of
their officers were attorneys with a strong real estate background (R. 213). Transactions of this
type and magnitude were not uncommon for them.

Yet, even if the parties reached the

agreement Embassy asserted they did, they made no effort whatsoever to comply with the legal
requirements to validate it.
The provisions of the Statute of Frauds applicable to contracts affecting interests in land
were adopted for the express purpose of preventing existing estates in land from being upset by
parol evidence, and to preserve the title to real property from the changes, the uncertainty, and
the fraud, attending the admission of parol testimony. 72 Am.Jur. 604-605, Statute of Frauds,
Section 44; See also, Martin v. ScholL 678 P.2d 274, 280 (Utah 1983); Ravarino v. Price. 260
P.2d 570 (Utah 1953). Hence, the general effect of such provisions is to require all contracts
concerning real estate to be in writing. Id., See also. U.C.A. 25-5-1 (1953 as amended). In
addition, an oral agreement to enter into or reduce to writing and execute an agreement affecting
an interest in lands is itself within the Statute of Frauds, and neither promise is enforceable
unless the statute is satisfied. Id.
Appellants can point to absolutely no writing to support their claims at trial or on appeal
so as to comply with the standard required by the Utah Statute of Frauds.4 It is well settled that

Embassy's witness Mark Wahlquist also testified that only Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 [Earnest
Money Agreement] was prepared and delivered to the Hatches for the sale of the property. (R.
55). That document clearly states the sales price was to be $40,000.
4

When asked at trial if there was any agreement between Granada/Shim [Embassy] and the
Hatches for $80,000, Mark Wahlquist testified, "Well, I knew there was no written agreement.
. ." (R. 90).
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a mortgage, in its legal aspect, is a conveyance of an estate or interest in the land, and, as such,
within the meaning of those terms as used in the Statute of Frauds. A mortgage cannot be
established by parol evidence even when it accompanies possession.

Likewise, an oral

agreement to give a mortgage in the future is in the nature of a contract for the sale of an
interest in land, and as such is, within the provision of the statute relating to such contracts.
Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Kimble. 272 NW 231 (Neb. 1937); Sleeth v. Sampson. 142 NE 355
(N.Y. 1923); See also, 30 ALR 1400.5
The overwhelming weight of authority in Utah also states that if an original agreement
is within the Statute of Frauds, a subsequent agreement which modifies the original written
agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds to be enforceable. Golden
Key Realty. Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt. Utah,
538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian. 465 P.2d 356, 358 & n.4 (Utah 1970);
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions. 48 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1935); Combined Metals. Inc.
vJBastian, 267 P. 1020, 1032 (Utah 1928); See also. 2 Corbin on Contracts 89-90, Section 301
(1950); 49 Am.Jur. 609-610, Statute of Frauds, Section 301. More importantly in this case, any
such additional agreement or modification of the original agreement must be sufficiently certain
and unequivocal in its terms that the parties understand what it is and what is to be done under
it. Martin v. Scholl. supra. 678 P.2d 276-278; Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319,
1322 (Utah 1975); Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 814 (Utah 1972); Birdzell v. Utah Oil
Refining Co.. 242 P.2d 578 (Utah 1952). Courts typically refuse to admit proof of an oral

5

It has also been held that a verbal agreement to create a lien on real estate in possession of
the promisor falls within the Statute of Frauds. Avey v. Via. 7 SW2d 1057 (Kentucky 1928).
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material modification of a written contract, because to do so would expose the oral modification
to the evils which the Statute of Frauds was intended to prevent. 49 Am.Jur., supra, at 610.
The Earnest Money Agreement, the Trust Deed Note, all of the closing documents
including the Buyer's and the Purchaser's Statement, all reflect that the total purchase price of
Lot 33 was to be $40,000.00. There is absolutely no written documentation or corroboration
that complies with the statute to support a finding that the purchase price was $80,000.00.
Further, Embassy was unable to produce any writing or memoranda to comply with the Statute
of Frauds concerning this transaction which reflects anything more than a $40,000.00 purchase
price. Legal mandate requires that in order to succeed in their argument for an additional
$40,000.00, such agreement must have complied with the requirements set forth in U.C.A.
Section 25-5-1.
Finally, before an oral contract for the sale of an interest in land can ever be enforced,
the oral contract and its terms must be clear, definite, mutually understood and established by
clear, unequivocal and definite testimony or other evidence sufficient to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds. Bradshaw v. McBride. supra. 649 P.2d at 79; Martin v. Scholl. supra. 678
P.2d at 276-278; Holmgren Brothers. Inc. v. Ballard. 534 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975); See also.
Rvan v. Earl. 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980).
The very crux of this dispute focused on the ambiguity between the parties as to the
terms of their agreement. The evidence at trial indicated that the parties engaged in extensive
negotiations concerning the purchase of a lot, including lots other than Lot 33 of the Bridlewood
Subdivision (R. 240-243). The Hatches emphasized to Embassy the fact that they could only
spend $40,000.00 to purchase a lot (R. 66, 240). However, at a minimum it was quite evident
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that there never existed a clear, definite and mutually understood agreement for anything other
than the purchase of Lot 33 for $40,000.00.
The Utah Supreme Court established a high evidentiary standard in Van Natta v.
Hey wood. 195 P. 192 (Utah 1920) in the context of oral land contracts;
This class of cases should be scrutinized with particular care; and unless under
the circumstances the proof is positive, clear, and convincing, the relief sought
should, and will, be denied. Id. at 574, 260 P.2d at 578.
In the case at bar, the totality of the parties agreement has been fully performed. The
Hatches agreed to pay $40,000.00 for Lot 33, $20,000.00 of which was paid at the time of
closing, and $20,000.00 of which was paid on July 22, 1987 (R. 66, 228). There is no other
agreement, either oral or written, particularly which evidences clear, definite, unequivocal and
mutually understood terms which the Trial Court could enforce. In fact, Embassy merely
contended at trial that the Hatches were going to pay an additional $40,000.00 "over a period
of one to two years and that it would likely be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the home
Hatch was living in...." (R. 67-68; Pre-trial Order p.3; see also Deposition of Mark Wahlquist
pp. 19-20). Appellants cannot even identify what they claim the terms of repayment were under
this supposed agreement, what the specific time for repayment was to have been, whether or not
security was required, and certainly they cannot provide any written documentation of this
purported agreement. Accordingly, the Trial Court properly denied their equitable claims.
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IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
GRANT RESTITUTION ON EMBASSY'S CLAIM FOR
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The Appellants recognize that any recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable written or oral contract exists. (Appellant's Brief at 16-17); Davies v. Olson, 746
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987). It is well settled law that quantum meruit recovery is
unavailable when the subject matter for which it is sought is covered by an express contract.
42 CJ.S. Implied Contracts. §35. The law will not imply a promise to pay the value of services
rendered and accepted if there is a special agreement to pay a particular amount or in a
particular manner for the services [subject matter] involved. Id.
In the 1978 Utah Supreme Court case of Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co.. 586
P.2d 461 (Utah 1978), the Court held that a claim for restitution under quasi contract will be
denied when there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the litigation. Id. 586
P.2d at 465.
Generally, a court sitting in equity may, however, reform instruments to correct errors
through a mistake of the parties when an instrument does not conform to the parties intent.
Reformation, however, is the remedy by which a court of equity rectifies a written instrument
to express the real intent of the parties when the instrument as actually written failed to do so
through mistake, fraud, or a combination of the two.

66 Am.Jur. 2d, Reformation of

Instruments, Section 1. Further, a void instrument cannot be reformed.

66 Am.Jur. 2d,

Reformation of Instruments, Section 7. There must have been an antecedent agreement which
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the written instrument evidences, and the mistake must have been in the drafting of the
instrument, not in the making of the contract [Emphasis added]. 66 Am.Jur. 2d, Reformation
of Instruments Section 13, 36.
A party is not entitled to equitable relief when the evidence shows that he was negligent,
aware, or should have been aware of the true facts. 27 Am.Jur. 2d, Equity, Section 34; 54
Am.Jur. 2d, Mistake, Accident or Surprise, Section 16. Appellants would like to have the court
accept that the parties agreed to enter into some kind of conspiracy to deceive the lender into
believing that the lot was being purchased for $40,000.00 rather than $80,000.00. The Trial
Court acknowledged that were it to accept that argument, Embassy would in essence be coming
to a court of equity with "unclean hands" seeking the court's blessing on their scheme to defraud
the lender.
The language of a written instrument, such as a deed, is presumed to correctly show the
intent of the parties or, in the case of a voluntary deed, of the grantor. The burden of proving
a mistake falls on the one asserting it, accordingly, a grantor seeking reformation of a deed has
the burden of proving that it is incorrect. Durham v. Creech. 231 SE2d 163 (N.C.App. 1977);
66 Am.Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, Section 117. Embassy simply did not meet that
burden.
Because Appellants failed to overcome the strong presumption that the written documents
involved correctly evidenced the intent of the parties by "clear and convincing evidence", their
claim for an additional $40,000.00 under a theory of unjust enrichment was properly denied by
the trial court.

22

CONCLUSION
Based on the trial court's findings and judgment, the overwhelming weight of evidence
in the record and legal precedent which supports the finding and judgment, coupled with the
foregoing arguments, the Appellees T. Daryl and Maureen Hatch respectfully submit that the
decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this tb

day of November, 1992.
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG

yMfa)
tiansen
Defendants/Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellees by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this /(? day of
November, 1992, and properly addressed as follows:
Heinz J. Mahler
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
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TRUST
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE

DEED

NOTE

When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$

Bountiful, Utah

20,0Q0,QQ

November 25

, 19

86

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

SHIM INVESTMENTS

Twenty Thousand and No/100

DOLLARS ($

together with interest from date at the rate of N/4
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows

per cent (

2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ),

N/A%) per annum on

The total sum of $20,000.00, shall be due in full upon receiving
long term financing or November 25, 1987, which ever occurs first.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of N/A
per
cent (
' %) per annum until paid
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of tune, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any pan thereof, with or without substitution
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith

ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS BYN0TE HOLDER:

T. "Dafyptetch
Maureen E. Hatch

PUINTlFFSEgilBIT
OMIKTiO..

-EXHTBTT
ATC 110

ft

A!

-»
IN EVIDENCE M

' *

*. *^ VJ

Aft^XXATEf) rilTe U_

"-

1

1a

6 / ' i n c::

WHEN rtECORDED MAIL TO

Name
Street
* d t dr « s

Walquist
200 North Main
S a l t Lake C i t y ,

#^iZ*>

1

M n r k

ULnh

State

L

!'\.li /

A'l'C-n-86-12308-dh

84103

J
- S P A C E ABOVE T H I S L I N E FOR R E C O R D E R S USE -

DEED OF TRUST
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

This Deed of Trust, twuio thn
25th
d a v of
T.
DARYL 1IA1C11 and MAUREEN E. HATCH
7j>56 S t o n e Road
__Salt
whose address is

_, 19 _ 8 6 _, between

November
Ijake

(Street nnd number*

Cit

Y

UT

, as TRUSTOR,
84121

(Cltv)

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY
, R Utah coiporntion. as TRUSTEE, and
SHIM INVESIMENTS

, a-* BENEFICIARY,

W i t n e s s e s : That Triistm CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH TOWER OF SALE, the following described
property, situated tn

__

Davis

Count v. State of Utah:

All of Lot 53, Bridlewood Subdivision Phase 2, according to the official
plat thereof, on file and of record in the Davis County Recorder's Office.

T o g e t h e r with i l l buddings fixture"? .ind i m p n i M i n r n h thereon mid nil wnter n e h K ru»hlv <<f u i\ PT , ment^ m i t ^ i n< • profits income t e n e m e n t s ,
h e r e d i t a m e n t s p m i l e p e s ,ind .ippurten.ini r s t h i r e u u t o belonging now <>i h i t ' ifi» r IIM d or e f , j n \ « d with Mid piop«rt\ -M m v p irt thereof S U B J E C T .
M ( ) W r \ KH to t h e right power and authontN hetetnafter g h e n to nnd <<»nfeiied ti|w n M« nefn i i r \ t o i nllei t and nppl\ VIK h rents, issues, a n d profits

For the Purpo* , .* Securing*
(1) poyment of the indebtedness evidenced b y a promissory note of even dote hereof m the principal sum of S
made by Trustor, p a y a b l e t o the order of Beneficiary at the t i m e *

20,000.00

in the m a n n e r a n d w i t h interest as therein set f o r t h , a n d a n y extensions a n d / o r re-

newals or modifications thereof, (2) the p e r f o r m a n c e of each agreement of Trustor herein contained, (3) the p a y m e n t of such a d d i t i o n a l loans or o d -

r V t T T B T m

f I T-k I I

11.17

15 The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the waiver by
Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a wo vcr of any other or subsequent default
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Time is of the essence hereof

aqreemept hereunder

Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any

indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any

oil sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary

In the event of such default

Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute n written notice of default and of election to cause said properly to be sold to satisfy the obliga
tions hereof

and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof is situated

also shall deposit with Trustee
17

Beneficiary

the note and nil documents evidencinq expenditures secured hereby

After the lapse of such time as may then b«» required by law following the recordation of said notice of default

notice of sale having been given as then required by law

Trustee

without demand on Trustor

and notice of default and

shall sell said property on the date and at the time

nnd place designated in said notice of «nl« either as a whole or in separate parcels and in such order as it may determine (but sub|ect to any satutory
right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property
bidder

if consisting of several known lots or paicels

the purchase price payable in lawful n oney of the United States at the time of sale

deems expedient

postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and

shall be soM) at public auction to the highest

The person conductma the »ale moy

in every su h case

public declaration thereof by such perssn at the time and place last appointed for the sale provided

if the sale is postponed for longer than one day

beyond the day designated in the notic* of sole notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notic- of sale
and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveymq said property so sold but without any covenant of warranty
of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof

Any person

for any cause he

notice of postponement shall be given by

express or implied

including Beneficiary

Trustee shall execute

The recitals in the Deed

may bid at the sale

Trustee shall apply

the p r o c e d s of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and e*pen«es of exercising the power of sale and of the sale including the payment of the Trustees
and attorneys fe*s (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustees Deed
under th» terms hereof

not then repaid

and (5) the remainder

if any

with accrued interest at

l o per annum from date of expenditure

to the person or persons ieqally entitled thereto

or th* Trustee

(3) all sums expended

(4) all qther sums then secured hereby

in its discretion may deposit the balance of such pro

ceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place
18

Trustor aqr*es to surrender

such sale
19

possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale immediately after

in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor
Upon the occurence of any default hereunder

Benefiooiy shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and pay

able and foreclose this Deed of Trust in ihe manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgaqes on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled
to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto
20

including a reasonable attorneys fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court

Beneficiary moy appoint a su cessor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which said

property or some port thereof is situated
nil the powers

duties

a substitution of trustee

From the time the substitution is filed for record

authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee

eda^d and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made
21

in the manner provided by law

This Deed of Trust shall apply to inure to the benefit of and bind all parties hereto

«i cc«»ssors and asstqns

All obliqations of Trustor hereunder are |omt and several

any pledgee of the note secured hereby

the new trustee shall succeed to

Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowl

their heirs

The term

legatees

Benelictary

devisees

administrators

shall mean the owner and holder

executors
including

In this Deed of Trust whenever the context so requires the masculine aender includes the feminine and or neuter

and the singular number includes the plural
22

Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Trust duly executed and acknowledged

is made a public record as provided by law

Trustee is not

obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor Beneficiary or Trustee
shall be a party unless brought by Truitee
23

This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
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The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sole hereunder be mailed to him at the address herein

before set forth

Signature < i 1 tuttnr

T., Daryf Hatch

x

hlsk

Maureen 1]. Hatch
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Davis
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^->ttl

fh% o f

November
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80
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,rrsoni||y

npr >eire<l

before me

Daryl Hatch and Maureen E. Hatch
rument who ilttlv "u know leMeeil to me that

they

executed the simp

Notary Public, Residing at

Salt Lake City, Utah
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f
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Secretary

HHI tint th« within inM f« r« poinr* instrument wis- <=iEneM in beinlf of said corporation by
M inlof D i m l T s

c-u h Mul\ i< V n »w \i Iqc M to mi tint «; uM i n |

inMsnl

inM

t iti u t X M tite I the simc inM th it tin

« i! iffixed is the s n l , f s iJM , nrpontlnn

M\ ( ommi^i n expires
Notarj Public, Residing at

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY
2982400

SELLER'S STATS4EOT
Associated T i t l e Company

P/CE 1

DATE: 11/25/86

GF ^£>: D12308

SALE FROM: SHIM INVESTMENTS
TO: T. DARYL HATCH and MAUREEN E. HATCH
KOPERTY:

3933 SOUTH BRIELENOCD DRIVE
BOUNTIEUL, UTAH 84010

SALES PRICE

$

40,000.00

GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER $

40,000.00

REIMBURSEMENTS / CREDITS:
NO REiraURSEMENTS / CREDITS

LESS: CHARGES AND DEDUCTIONS:
Dcwn Payment or Earnest Money

$

100.00

Title Policy Charges:
Title insurance
to Associated Title Company
$
117.00
Escrcw to Associated Title Company
$
75.00
Total Title Policy Charges $

192.00

NOTE FOR SELLERS EQUITY

$

20f000.00

TOTAL CHARGES AND DEDUCTIONS $
NET AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER $

20,292.00
19,708.00

Seller understands the Closing or-Escrow Agent has assembled this information
representing the transaction from the best information available from other
sources and cannot guarantee the accuracy thereof. Any real estate agent or
lender involved may be furnished a copy of this Statement.
Seller understands that tax and insurance prorations and reserves were
based on figures for the preceding year or supplied by others, or estimates
for current year, and in the event of any change for current year, all
necessary adjustments must be nade between Purchaser and Seller direct.
The undersigned hereby authorizes the Closing or Escrow Agent to make
expenditures and disbursements as shown above and approves same for payment.
The undersigned also acknowledges receipt of Loan Ponds, if applicable, in
the amount shewn above and receipt of a copy of this Statement.

PUWTIFFS EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT MO.
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EXHIBIT "C"
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SHIM INVESTMENTS
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'
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* Note: Interest of existing liens is figured to the date indicated. If not
paid by then, additional interest will have to be collected and your
statement will be adjusted to have sufficient funds to secure release
from the lienholder.

iC

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY
298-2400 PURCHASER'S STATEMENT
Associated Title Company

PA3E 1

ATE: 11/25/86

GF NO: D12308

ALE FROM: SHIM INVESTMENTS
TO: T. DARYL HATCH and MAUREEN E. HATCH
*OPERTY:

3933 SOOTH BRIDLEWOOD DRIVE
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010

JRCHASE PRICE

$

40f000.00

US: CHARGES / DISBURSEMENTS:
Recording and Transfer Charges:
Recording fee: Deed
$
6.00
Recording fee: Mortgage
$
20.00
Total Recording and Transfer Charges $

26.00

Title Policy Charges:
Escrow to Associated Title Company .... $
75.00
Total Title Policy Charges $

75.00

TOTAL CHARGES / DISBURSEMENTS $
GROSS AMOUNT DUE BY HJRCHASER $
SS: CREDITS / FUNDS RECEIVED:
Down Payment or Earnest Money
NOTE FOR SELLERS EQUITY

$
$

101.00
40f101.00

100.00
20f000.00

TOTAL CREDITS / FUNDS RECEIVED $
NET AMOUNT DUE BY HJRCHASER $

20f 100.00
20,001.00

rchaser understands the Closing or Escrow Agent has assembled this information
presenting the transaction from the best information available from other
urces and cannot guarantee the accuracy thereof. Any real estate agent or
rider involved may be furnished a copy of this Statement.
rchaser understands that tax and
sed on figures for the preceding
c current year, and in the event
:essary adjustments must be made

insurance prorations and reserves were
year or supplied by others, or estimates
of any change for current year, all
between Purchaser and Seller direct.

* undersigned hereby authorizes the Closing or Escrow Agent to make
penditures and disbursements as shown above and approves same for payment.
* undersigned also acknowledges receipt of Loan Funds, if applicable, in
2 amount shown above and receipt of a copy of this Statement.

EXHIBIT

M

Df!

Note: Interest of existing liens is figured to the date indicated. If not
paid by then, additional interest will have to be collected and your
statement will be adjusted to have sufficient funds to secure release
from the lienholder.
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
[CORPORATE FORM]

SHIM INVESTMENTS, a Utah L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p , by i t s G e n e r a l
, a corporation
P a r t n e r . GRANADA, INC.
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
S a l t Lake C i t y
» o f C o u n t v of S a i t L a k e
, State of Utah
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against the Acts of the Grantor only to
T.
DARYL HATCH and MAUREEN E. HATCH, husband and w i f e , a s
tenants

joint
grantee
for the sum of
—
DOLLARS
County,

0f

S a l t Lake C i t y , County of Davis
TEN AND NO/100
the following: described tract of land in
Davis
State of Utah:

A l l of Lot 3 3 , BRIDLEWOOD SUBDIVISION PHASE 2 , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
official plat thereof,
on f i l e and of r e c o r d in t h e Davis County
Recorder's Office.

OV-v<VS~oo^3

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
25th day of
November
, A. D. 19 86
Attest
GRANADA, INC.

-cyVv

Assistant Secretary.
Vice-

[CORPORATE SEAL]

President.

S f ATE OF UTAH,
County of S a l t Lake
On the
25th
day of
November
,A.D.
1986
personally appeared before me Keith B. Sorenseiand
LaMar C. Hatch
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said K e i t h B. S o r e n s e n
is the
V i c e - president, and he, the said LaMar C. Hatch
is the secretary
of
Granada, I n c .
, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
directors and said Keith B. Sorensen
and
LaMar C. Hatch
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.

I
My commission expires.

\r^^r4- ^

sex U J^J/ v\

ft

^
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J

^

My residence is.

FORM I 0 4 C — W A R R A N T Y D E E D . S P E C I A L . CORP. FORM— O OEM PTO CO. — 3219 s o 29QO EAST — SALT LAKE CITY
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^Notary Public.

